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1The economic crisis that has unfolded since 2008 has had, and 
continues to have, a profound effect on the lives of Europe’s 
citizens. Economically, politically and socially, the crisis has led to 
fundamental changes in many EU member states.
This report seeks to examine the new ‘social reality’ of post-crisis 
Europe. In essence it describes how a profound divergence of experi-
ence between north and south challenges previous assumptions that 
European integration would drive a seemingly automatic process 
of convergence. Altogether, we identify four separate dynamic 
forces that have the potential to reshape Europe’s social reality in 
the coming years. First, the most explicit effects of the crisis have 
been felt across economies and labour markets, with Europe’s 
relative economic performance analysed and compared in the first 
section. Second, there is much debate about the effects of the crisis 
on Europe’s poorest citizens, particularly in relation to poverty and 
inequality, the issues that dominate section two of the report. Third, 
the EU has set ambitious targets for progress in education, while the 
effects of the crisis on health have been much discussed; there are 
ongoing debates about the sustainability of existing systems of public 
service provision, specifically education and health. These chal-
lenges are assessed in the third part of the report. In the fourth section 
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of the report, the political and cultural makeup of post-crisis Europe 
is examined, with unsettling implications for Europe’s political class.
The divergence this report describes has taken place against the 
backdrop of trends and developments already in train long before 
the crisis hit. The process of deindustrialisation and the associated 
decline of employment in manufacturing industry has been wrought 
by technological change, a global shift in economic power from west 
to east and rising consumer demands for services. These long-term, 
structural trends across most EU member states have contributed to 
the rise of more precarious work arrangements and the strengthening 
of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ divisions in labour markets. Moreover, the 
implementation of policies today associated with ‘crisis’ austerity 
programmes such as benefit conditionality, employment activation, 
higher retirement ages and reductions in benefit entitlements are 
not ‘new’ policies in European welfare states. They have been part 
of the reform landscape of Europe since the late 1990s. Such poli-
cies were pioneered before the eurozone crisis in countries such as 
Germany, Sweden and the UK, with new recruits – such as Italy and 
Spain – now following suit. This interplay between policy change 
and more fundamental, structural forces has influenced debates 
about the future of Europe since before the crisis, with calls for 
a ‘new’ welfare state or social model for Europe, achieving their 
strongest political expression through the launch of the Lisbon 
agenda in 1999.1 As well as creating new challenges, the crisis has 
accentuated the impact of pre-existing trends, raising profound ques-
tions about the sustainability and success of the European model.
So while old problems are being aggravated in European soci-
eties, new problems are emerging.2 While Europe has never had, 
nor necessarily aspired to create, a uniform social model,3 and the 
enlargement of the union has only served to expand the varieties 
of European ‘welfare capitalism’. Yet for all this diversity, the 
common pre-crisis assumption of converging social standards and 
economic growth has been shattered. The Lisbon strategy assumed 
that the ‘European social model’, despite its distinctive national vari-
ants with their own institutional path dependency, faced common 
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challenges that the EU could help address by laying down common 
principles of action and reform. The impact of the crisis has also 
called this previous assumption into question. A Europe of diverg-
ing regions is increasingly evident, as old ambitions of a European-
wide convergence in prosperity have ground to a halt. Partly as a 
consequence, migration from struggling states to richer ones has 
intensified. Public concerns about the social and economic impact 
of more rapid migration have intensified debate about the viability 
of multiculturalism and the prospects of more integrated societies. 
Prospering in this more insecure and politically unstable Europe are 
the populist parties: whether from the left, as in Greece and Spain, 
or the right, as in France and the UK.
This report offers a broad overview of key trends in structural 
divergence. Other developments such as patterns of gender inequal-
ity and the life chances of ethnic minority groups are not considered, 
but remain of vital importance. Throughout, the report charts the 
social, economic and political forces remaking the new, post-crisis 
Europe. Ultimately, the intention is to better understand the chal-
lenges facing the EU and its member states. This is necessary if 
economic competitiveness, inclusive prosperity, social sustainability 
and political cohesion are to be restored.
NOTES
1. See Esping-Andersen, G. (2002), Why We Need a New Welfare State, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. See Social Protection Committee (2014), Social Europe: Aiming for 
Inclusive Growth – Annual Report of the Social Protection Committee, 
Brussels: European Commission.
3. See Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. In it, he outlined his influential thesis of 
the different ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’, challenging the notion of a single 
European model and homogeneous road to prosperity. Esping-Andersen 
argued that Europe had three distinct models of welfare capitalism: liberal, 
corporate-conservative and social democratic. The UK, Germany and Sweden 
are often taken as the respective archetypes for each ‘welfare regime’.

5ECONOMIC GROWTH
Although the most serious risks of the economic crisis such as a com-
plete breakdown of the eurozone have seemingly now been averted 
(although at the time of writing, a Greek exit remains distinctly 
plausible), many European states nevertheless continue to endure 
anaemic economic growth and seemingly chronic structural weak-
nesses. In November 2014, the European commission significantly 
downgraded its forecasts for growth in the eurozone. In its February 
2015 forecast, the commission pointed to ‘new developments . . . 
that are expected to brighten in the near term the EU’s economic 
outlook that would have otherwise deteriorated’. Predicted growth 
for the eurozone is now expected to rise from a sluggish 0.8 per cent 
in 2014 to 1.3 per cent in 2015 and 1.9 per cent in 2016. Crucially, 
Germany – the economic engine of the eurozone – has predicted 
growth of 1.5 per cent in 2015 and two per cent in 2016. This modest 
trend towards the return of to growth is put down to the decline in 
oil prices, the depreciation of the euro, the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) embrace of a large-scale quantitative easing programme, 
and the commission’s own InvestEU investment plan. However, 
even on this more optimistic outlook, the commission still expects 
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unemployment in the eurozone to average 10.6 per cent in 2016 and 
9.3 per cent in the EU as a whole: this is considerably above the 
pre-crisis levels of 7.5 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively.1 
Even in Germany, which has been the EU’s greatest success story 
in terms of employment growth, the modest prospects of growth 
feed fears of a ‘German illusion’, the phrase coined by the economist 
Marcel Fratzscher to describe Germany’s apparent economic weak-
nesses and underlying vulnerabilities.2 In short, Fratzscher argues 
that Germany’s economic strength has been embellished by factors 
such as its labour market performance, with deep weaknesses in 
other areas of the economy, such as a comparatively low rate of 
domestic investment and a rapidly ageing population. On the other 
hand, Germany is increasingly at the centre of a cluster of countries 
such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Romania 
that excel in manufacturing and are where Europe’s industrial jobs 
are increasingly located.3 This shift in the pattern of manufacturing 
and supply chains has been a factor in the challenges of declining 
competitiveness and social sustainability that southern Europe faces. 
The overall figures for the EU and the eurozone conceal vast 
differences in predicted economic performance. For instance, after 
years of sluggish growth and a ‘double-dip’ recession, Ireland and 
the UK are predicted to enjoy robust growth in 2016: 4.6 per cent in 
Ireland and 2.7 per cent in the UK. Nevertheless, claims of a resur-
gence of success in the UK in particular should be treated cautiously. 
Despite the gradual re-emergence of UK growth over the last 
18 months (in part a bounce-back against the calamitous drop in 
output immediately after the financial crisis), and the strong growth 
in employment, a long-term view of economic performance indi-
cates a deeper trend of relative UK decline compared to the major 
economies of continental Europe. In the years before the crisis 
among the four big EU economies – the UK economy had caught up 
with France and Germany, which had previously enjoyed the highest 
GDP per person levels in purchasing power standard (PPS).4 
By 2005, the UK had a GDP per person PPS of 27,800: higher than 
Germany (26,000), France (24,700) and Italy (22,400). By 2013, 
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Figure 2.1 Actual and predicted GDP in the eurozone: 2010–15. Source: 
European commission.
Figure 2.2 GDP per person in France, Italy, Germany and the UK: 2005–13. 
Source: Eurostat. Note: GDP per person in purchasing power standard.
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however, the UK stood at 27,200. This was some way behind that of 
Germany (32,000) and even France (27,800), a trend that might seem 
surprising given the portrayal of the French economy as a ‘basket 
case’ by sections of the UK political and media establishment.
That the economic crisis has driven new trends in GDP growth in 
Europe is evident in the experiences of other countries in the EU. 
As Figure 2.3 indicates, the three northern European countries of 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden enjoyed steadily rising GDP 
per person PPS growth between 2005 and 2013. Equally in eastern-
central Europe, the Czech Republic and Poland have continued to 
thrive economically. In particular, Polish growth has been remark-
able: from a GDP per person PPS of 11,500 to 17,500 in eight years. 
This is part of the Polish ‘economic miracle’; in 2009, when the 
EU was in the darkest nadir of the crisis, Poland was the only EU 
economy that continued to experience economic growth. The EU’s 
‘convergence machine’ is still alive and well to Germany’s east. 
As such, Poland’s real GDP is now almost 20 per cent higher 
than in 2008, while the rest of the EU is only recently making up 
its losses from when the financial crisis first broke. Where those 
Figure 2.3 GDP per person in selected EU countries: 2005–13. Source: Eurostat. 
Note: GDP per person in purchasing power standard.
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losses have been most severe is also shown in Figure 2.3: Greece, 
where GDP per person was lower in 2012 compared to 2005, and 
Spain, where by 2013 there was a rise of just 1,600 (and a loss of 
1,700 since 2007, the high point of Spanish GDP). The scale of this 
divergence is illustrated in Figure 2.4, which shows the average 
GDP per person change between 2005 and 2013 across the EU’s 
seven distinct regions.5 Average change has been greatest in the 
Baltic region (6,000) but with relatively strong growth of over 
4,000 PPS in the continental, Nordic, east-central and south-eastern 
regions. In contrast, the southern member states have collectively 
experienced a rise in GDP per person of only 1,633 since the crisis. 
The UK and Ireland fared the worst, however, with an overall joint 
contraction of 150, underlining their unusual degree of exposure to 
the financial services sector. 
This picture is seemingly at odds with the economic progress appar-
ently enjoyed by the UK in the past two years. However, while the 
UK has recently experienced some of the strongest economic growth 
in the EU, with 2.6 per cent growth in the last year 6 and a buoyant 
labour market,7 its poor performance on living standards reflects 
the unique experience of the UK during the crisis. This includes a 
significantly sharper fall in GDP during 2008–09 compared to other 
countries, an over-dependence on financial services, the depreciation 
of sterling against the euro, and the apparent transition of the UK 
from a pre-crisis economy of high employment and high wages to 
a post-crisis economy of high employment and low wages, reflect-
ing weak productivity growth and, throughout periods, strong net 
migration expanding the workforce. As the ONS observes, before 
2008 the UK had the highest growth in wages in the G7; in the post-
crisis world, however, the UK now has the lowest wages among the 
industrialised countries.8 Living standards have begun to improve in 
recent months as nominal wages outstrip the unusually low inflation 
rate, but the disparity in the UK’s economic performance – between 
high growth and stagnant living standards – is an important feature 
of political debate in the UK which shows little sign of abating. 
In February 2015, for example, the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
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confirmed that the incomes of working-age people in the UK were 
yet to rise above pre-crisis levels in 2007–08.9 The over-65s have 
done better. 
Another dimension of the post-crisis economy in Europe is the 
exacerbation of regional inequalities. Europe now has an arc of 
wealth growing through the centre of the continent to Scandinavia 
and south-east England and touching north-east Spain and northern 
Italy. Regional differences within many states are pronounced, 
however, most notably in Italy, Spain and the UK. In 2011, regional 
GDP per person (PPS) in Britain ranged from 80,400 in Inner 
London to 16,100 in West Wales and the Valleys. Furthermore, 
the gap between the two regions has grown since the start of the 
last decade. Other deprived regions in the UK have similarly 
experienced a decline in GDP since before the crisis, most notably 
Cornwall, Northern Ireland and the Tees Valley. 
In short, the distribution of economic growth in Europe looks 
startlingly different in 2013 compared to 2005. Some regions, such 
as the northern and central-eastern countries, are considerably richer 
per inhabitant. Others, most notably the south of Europe and the 
Figure 2.4 Average GDP per person change 2005–13 by EU region. Source: 
Eurostat. Note: GDP per person in purchasing power standard.
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English-speaking countries, have fared much worse. Many of these 
poor performers have deep-seated weaknesses in intermediate skills. 
Ireland, Spain and the UK have had to cope with the after-effects of 
property booms that collapsed. Underlying this shift are deep struc-
tural trends that pre-existed the financial crisis, not least the growing 
disconnection between the southern member states and manufactur-
ing production chains in the industrial heartlands of Europe, as the 
accession countries in the east provide more accessible, low-cost 
labour.10 
INCOMES
Europe has always been a union comprised of economic unequals, 
but the section above indicates a sharpening of these inequali-
ties over time, especially between the robust performance of the 
northern continental states and the experience of the poorer member 
states along the Mediterranean. Although the wider ambition of 
European convergence still seems a credible goal for the rapidly 
expanding eastern European countries, the prospect of those in the 
south – which, with their rapid economic and income growth in the 
1990s and 2000s, appeared to represent the realisation of European 
convergence – have now declined.
Alongside GDP, changes in incomes further underline the new 
social reality of post-crisis Europe. Table 2.5 shows evidence of the 
great stagnation in British living standards, with median net equiv-
alised incomes (PPS) falling from 16,894 in 2005 to 16,469 in 2013. 
Such figures give credence to the centre-left critique in the UK: that 
Table 2.5 Median incomes in France, Germany, Italy and the UK: 2005–1311
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FR 14,503 14,981 15,149 17,493 17,741 17,782 18,161 18,784 19,384
DE 15,651 15,167 17,325 18,007 17,954 17,573 18,395 19,208 19,371
IT 13,680 13,871 14,401 15,262 15,198 15,206 15,781 15,575 15,342
UK 16,894 17,630 18,778 18,543 16,819 15,869 15,776 16,447 16,469
Source: Eurostat. Note: Median equivalised net incomes.
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despite robust economic and employment growth in recent years, 
living standards have remained stagnant for almost a decade and 
that this is not a recovery that is significantly touching the lives of 
ordinary citizens. This is in stark contrast to the continued increase 
in median incomes in both France and Germany, while even Italy 
has experienced some income growth, albeit at a significantly slower 
rate. The impact of the crisis has seen the UK lose its position as the 
most prosperous of the major economies: UK living standards are 
now more on par with Italy than either France or Germany.
Yet the starkest divergence in living standards is between the 
north and south of Europe. Taking a sample of 11 northern and 
southern countries, Figure 2.6 shows growth in median incomes 
between 2005 and 2013. In 2005, the difference between the poorest 
and richest states – Austria and Portugal, respectively – was 8,958 
(PPS). In 2013, Austria and Greece now represented the two end 
poles of prosperity in the north and south, yet the difference in 
incomes between the poles has expanded to 11,838: an increase of 
32 per cent. On incomes as with GDP, the EU is far from converging: 
rather, structural divergence characterises the economic trajectory of 
post-crisis Europe.
Figure 2.6 Change in median incomes: 2005–13. Source: Eurostat. Note: Median 
equivalised income (purchasing power standard).
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LABOUR MARKETS
The greatest structural divergence in Europe today is not in GDP 
growth or incomes, however, but in employment opportunities and 
labour markets. The Europe 2020 strategy, announced in 2010 as 
a successor to the Lisbon agenda, has a headline target of getting 
75 per cent of 20–64 year-olds into work across the EU. This is an 
ambitious objective, but progress towards the goal up to 2008 was 
positive, when an average employment rate across member states of 
almost 71 per cent was reached. A large element of this improve-
ment was due to the significantly higher labour market participa-
tion rates of women and the over-55s. Between 2002 and 2008, 
the employment of women in the EU-27 rose from 58.1 per cent 
to 62.8 per cent. Since 2008, however, the employment rate of 
women has slightly reversed, declining by 0.2 per cent in 2012–13. 
In overall terms, there has been a sharp decline in employment par-
ticipation since 2009 across the EU which has yet to recover, and 
Europe’s overall participation rate remains stagnant six years on 
from the crisis.
National experiences of employment participation are, of course, 
hugely divergent. It is through the prism of employment and labour 
Figure 2.7 Labour force participation rates and the Europe 2020 target. Source: 
Eurostat. Note: Labour force participation rates of 20–64 year-olds.
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markets that the heterogeneous impact of the crisis in Europe 
becomes starkest. As a result, the Europe of 2015 looks very dif-
ferent from the Europe of 10 years ago. Figure 2.8 maps labour 
force participation rates in the EU, demonstrating the sheer scale of 
inequality in employment rates ranging from a low of 53 per cent in 
Greece to a high of 80 per cent in Sweden. Furthermore, these two 
extremes symbolise the emergence of two distinct labour market 
blocs. The highest labour market participation rates are concentrated 
in a north-central bloc of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, where they have risen to over 75 per cent of the labour 
force. In contrast to this successful core there is, with the exception 
of Cyprus, a southern and eastern bloc – alongside Ireland – where 
participation rates in 2013 all fell below 65 per cent. 
The labour market situation in Europe is a different reality to that 
which existed before the crisis. Figure 2.9 shows the unemployment 
rates of 14 countries in both 2005 and 2013. In 2005, Germany 
had the highest unemployment rate among the selected 14 states. 
Remarkably, by 2013 Germany had the second lowest rate within 
the same group of countries, experiencing a reduction in unemploy-
ment of six per cent since 2005 despite the crisis. Greece, Spain 
and Cyprus, however, saw unemployment rocket during the same 
time period: by 18, 17 and 11 per cent respectively. The extremely 
low unemployment figures for Germany are an integral part of the 
Figure 2.8 EU-wide variation in employment of those aged 20–64. Source: 
Eurostat.
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country’s economic success during the past five years, in which 
Germany appears to have transformed itself through the renewal 
of its industrial base: from a relatively high unemployment labour 
market to one that is increasingly buoyant. 
LIVING STANDARDS AND THE GENERATIONS
A further dimension of post-crisis Europe is demography and the 
variable impact of the crisis on different age cohorts. The living 
standards of older people have been largely protected and, in some 
instances, have continued to improve despite the crisis, as the result 
of discretionary policy choices by governments. Explanations for 
the relatively protected position of pensioners vary, ranging from 
the higher propensity of older people to vote, to welfare state 
‘path dependency’: these constitute substantial obstacles to reform 
of existing pensions’ systems. Since 2005, employment rates for 
older workers have risen year-on-year: from 42 per cent in 2005 
to 50 per cent in 2015, bucking the trend in overall participation 
rates seen in Figure 2.7. Furthermore, the increase in the employ-
ment of older workers is an almost uniform trend across Europe. 
Only three countries – Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal – have seen the 
Figure 2.9 Unemployment rates: 2005–13. Source: Eurostat.
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participation of older workers in the labour market decline. Northern 
European states have continued to perform well in this regard, while 
some eastern European examples – such as Bulgaria, Poland and 
Slovakia – equally stand out as success stories on this measure.
For older people not in work, relative living standards have also 
improved. Figure 2.11 shows both the change in the median income 
of the over-65s and changes in pensions spending between 2005 
and 2012–13. In most European countries, the median incomes 
of older people have continued to grow despite the crisis. A large 
determinant of that growth is also illustrated in the graph; in most 
countries, expenditure on pensions has continued to increase relative 
to other public spending priorities. While social spending has been 
reduced in many areas of the welfare state, especially on benefits for 
people of working age, expenditure on pensions has been protected 
in many EU countries. Only four have reduced their spending on 
pensions since the crisis: Germany, Hungary, Poland and Sweden. 
This indicates that the observed differences in the position of older 
people do not follow a pattern of regional divergence: indeed 
measured by their relative position, pensioners in Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain have done well – among the most 
improved in Europe. 
It is important to note, however, that this is a relative improve-
ment, largely due to the extremity of cuts in other parts of the welfare 
Table 2.10 Percentage change in the employment rate of older workers: 2005–13
% change % change % change
Germany 18 France 7.1 Sweden 4.2
Netherlands 14 Czech Rep. 7.1 Lithuania 3.8
Slovakia 13.7 Estonia 6.9 UK 3
Poland 13.4 Greece 6 Slovenia 2.8
Austria 13.1 Finland 5.8 Denmark 2.2
Bulgaria 12.7 Hungary 5.5 Romania 2.1
Italy 11.3 Latvia 5.3 Spain 0.1
Belgium 9.9 Croatia 5.2 Ireland -0.3
Luxembourg 8.8 Malta 4.3 Cyprus -1.0
Portugal -3.5
Source: Eurostat.
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state.12 There are also major variations in the living standards of 
those of pensionable age: women over 60 in single households 
remain especially vulnerable to poverty, as are those whose private 
pensions offer an inadequate retirement income – a situation exac-
erbated by the downturn in equity markets in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis. Furthermore, reforms to public pensions systems in 
southern European countries will reduce the value of pensions to 
those now approaching retirement age. In Greece, for example, not 
only have the retirement ages been raised but, additionally, pensions 
in the future will be calculated from average lifetime pay rather than 
the more generous final salary indexation. 
The evidence concerning the living standards of older people 
raises a major political question about post-crisis Europe: whether 
the distributional positions of particular social groups have been 
Figure 2.11 Changes in the median incomes of older people and pensions 
spending in Europe: 2005–12/13. Source: Eurostat.
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prioritised over others. The relative strengthening of the living stan-
dards of older people in Europe has occurred alongside a simultane-
ous decline in the life-chances of young people and families with 
children. However, the new regional political economy of Europe 
ensures that for young people in southern Europe, life prospects are 
very different to those in the north.
The divide in the life-chances of young people is at its starkest 
in the contrasting experiences of Germany and Greece. As part of 
its ‘jobs miracle’, the commitment to labour market reforms and an 
enviable high-quality apprenticeship system, Germany achieved a 
reduction in youth unemployment of eight per cent between 2005 
and 2013. Such is the achievement of Germany in providing jobs 
for young people that in 2013 the German government launched a 
scheme to attract those under 25 from the rest of Europe to partici-
pate in its lauded apprenticeship programme. This is another world 
from the experience of Greece, where austerity has hit the youngest 
most severely: a staggering 36 per cent more Greeks under the age 
of 25 are out of work than was the case before the crisis. In both 
Greece and Spain, a young person is more likely to be unemployed 
than in work: a terrifying development that risks the creation of a 
crisis-scarred ‘lost generation’ in southern Europe.
Figure 2.12 highlights the emergence of distinct labour market 
blocs that characterise Europe’s economic geography. In the largest 
sphere on the right are countries that combine high youth unemploy-
ment rates of over 30 per cent with relatively high ‘NEET’ (not in 
employment, education or training) rates of around a fifth of young 
people.13 In these countries – which span the west to east of Europe’s 
southern coastline – young people face a double penalty: not only 
are many currently unemployed, but they are not in structured 
education or training, as such, they face a long-term erosion of 
their labour market prospects. Just behind this worst affected bloc 
of countries – again, drawn mostly from the south and east – are 
another group experiencing worrying levels of youth exclusion. 
In the bottom left of the graph are countries not too distant geograph-
ically but worlds away in their labour market realities. These include 
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Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark – where youth 
unemployment and NEET rates are extremely low at present. 
In the worst-performing countries even highly skilled graduates 
have suffered badly since the crisis. In Greece, the graduate employ-
ment rate has fallen by 13 per cent since 2005, although many other 
countries have maintained relatively high levels of graduate employ-
ment throughout the crisis. The marked decline in opportunities for 
the young in southern Europe is signifying the emergence of a new 
wave of migration in Europe, as young people from Greece, Italy 
and Spain cross the continent in search of work. As Table 2.13 dem-
onstrates, in the UK alone the number of national insurance registra-
tions issued to citizens from Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal rose 
by a rate of 3–5 times between 2006 and 2013 for each country. This 
is creating tensions in the countries to which young people migrate, 
as populist, anti-immigrant parties thrive. This same exodus may be 
the harbinger of vast skills shortages in future in southern countries. 
National statistical agencies in Italy, Portugal and Spain estimate 
that over 130,000 young people have left each country respectively 
since the start of the crisis in 2008.14 The scale of youth exclusion in 
the south is creating a further phenomenon, in which young migrants 
Figure 2.12 Youth unemployment and ‘NEET’ rates in the EU: 2013. Source: 
Eurostat.
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from these member states return to their former colonies – such 
as Angola and Brazil in the case of the young Portuguese – in the 
hope of a better economic future. In response to the youth crisis, 
the EU has adopted a European-wide Youth Guarantee programme 
in which all those under the age of 25 and out of work are guaran-
teed a job or training. Yet the figure devoted to implementing the 
Youth Guarantee – €6bn – is, according to the International Labour 
Organisation, way below what is needed to seriously tackle the scale 
of youth unemployment in today’s Europe.15
SUMMARY
The impact of the crisis on the economies and labour markets of the 
EU has inevitably been heterogeneous, leading to a further diver-
gence in living standards across Europe. At one end of the spectrum 
the UK has experienced a deep stagnation since the financial crisis, 
with 2013 median incomes comparable to those in 2005. That said, 
the UK Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) recently reported 
that it expected living standards to rise up to 2020, although ques-
tions remain about how evenly the gains will be spread across the 
income distribution.16 Meanwhile, Germany has forged ahead – 
increasing median incomes significantly and simultaneously achiev-
ing very low rates of unemployment – while surrounding states, such 
as Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria, have continued to thrive. 
The situation in the south of Europe is worlds apart, as incomes 
stagnate and, in some instances, fall below pre-crisis levels, while 
Table 2.13 Number of national insurance number registrations in the UK from 
southern Europe: 2006–13
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EL 3249 3649 2931 2751 3260 5598 7417 9891
ES 9654 11836 11777 14281 19858 30020 38075 51729
IT 11060 15742 16462 16876 18464 24891 26605 44113
PT 9696 12039 12983 12211 12064 16347 20443 30121
Source: ONS (2015), Statistical Bulletin: National Insurance Number Allocations to Adults Entering 
the UK, London: DWP.
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rates of joblessness have rocketed to previously unheard of levels, 
particularly among young people. As a result, the pre-crisis ambi-
tion of European economic convergence has stalled and, in some 
instances, gone into reverse. The uneven impact of austerity has 
imposed a horizontal line across a new, economically divided, 
post-crisis Europe. 
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In May 2014, Mark Carney, the Bank of England governor, issued 
a grave warning about the dangers of rising rewards at the top of 
society and the threat this posed to the legitimacy of the capital-
ist system.1 This was a warning apparently heeded as billionaires 
and economic elites met for the annual World Economic Forum at 
Davos in January 2015. Unusually, the worrying scale and impact of 
income inequality in the industrialised countries was firmly on the 
agenda. This is a sign of the times in the wake of the financial crisis. 
No longer is income inequality the exclusive concern and priority 
of the ideological left; central bankers, and even some among the 
super-rich, are now apparently concerned by the scale of runaway 
rewards for those at the top as median incomes appear to stagnate 
or rise anaemically. While their motivations vary – ranging from 
sympathy with the goal of social justice to the need to ‘save capital-
ism from itself’ – there are few who claim burgeoning inequality is 
no longer a major issue for our societies. Inequality is now blamed 
for a whole range of social ills: from ill-health, crime and civil 
disorder 2 to economic pathologies, such as the unsustainable credit 
boom, that created the conditions for the crisis at the outset.3 
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In Europe, where many countries pride themselves on lower 
levels of economic inequality than other parts of the developed 
world such as the United States, the crisis has led to a sharp overall 
spike in inequality, particularly in the eurozone. Figure 3.1 shows 
changes in two measures of inequality – the Gini coefficient and the 
quintile ratio.4 Between 2007 and 2008, the eurozone experienced 
a sharp rise in income inequality on both of these measures. Since 
then, inequality has continued to creep up gradually: from a Gini 
coefficient of 29.3 in 2005 to 30.6 by 2013. 
Unlike the measures of growth, unemployment and living 
standards discussed in the preceding section, patterns of income 
inequality in individual member states point to varying national tra-
jectories with much less clear regional divides. There is no straight-
forward geographical divergence between the north and south: the 
problem of inequality – and the extent to which it is successfully 
being tackled – varies country by country across Europe. 
As such, some of the high-performing countries identified in 
the previous section have experienced significant increases in 
income inequality since 2005. These include Denmark, Germany 
and Sweden where, despite income growth and low levels of 
Figure 3.1 Income inequality in the eurozone: 2005–13. Source: Eurostat.
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unemployment, the gap between the rich and poor has widened. This 
is a particular concern for the Nordic countries, where low income 
inequality is viewed as central to garnering support for generous 
welfare states but where, crucially, inequalities have grown at a 
faster rate than many other countries since the 2000s. According 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), this has been driven by the increasing rewards distributed 
to the top 10 per cent of earners, whose incomes have raced ahead of 
both the middle and the bottom of the income distribution.5
Inequality has also spiralled in Romania and, especially, 
Bulgaria: for some commentators, this is the price to be paid for 
‘pro-market’ economic reforms. However, the group of countries 
that have seen significant inequality reductions are a highly diverse 
cluster. The rapid economic growth experienced by Poland per-
haps explains why inequality has fallen so far since the 2000s. 
Yet the UK experience – so long a European pariah characterised 
by high inequality rates – is significantly harder to explain. Plau-
sible explanations might include the delayed impact of benefit 
cuts to the poorest groups, the stagnation of incomes in the middle 
class, the decline in bonuses paid out in the pre-2008 boom years 
to those working in financial services, and the higher tax receipts 
paid by those at the top. Between 2010 and 2011 in the wake of 
the financial crisis, the Gini co-efficient fell faster in the UK than 
at any point for 50 years. The Resolution Foundation reports that 
hourly pay fell furthest among the highest paid between 2009 and 
2014 in the UK, although the trend was relatively uniform across 
the distribution.6 
Equally difficult to explain are the inequality trends in the coun-
tries most damaged by austerity in southern Europe and Ireland. 
While Greece, Spain and Cyprus have all experienced rising inequal-
ity, Ireland and Portugal have managed to bring inequality down. 
Furthermore, given the scale of austerity in Greece and Spain, the 
change in inequality has been relatively modest in these countries, 
ranging from between 1.2 to 1.5 Gini points. The situation in Europe 
might lead to the straightforward prediction of rising inequality in 
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the south and contained inequality in the north, yet this is clearly not 
the case. It is evidently a myth to conceptualise a Europe of high 
inequality in the English-speaking and southern states, and of low 
inequality in the north. In this context, the value of existing income 
inequality data – and its worth as a measure of the quality of life – 
also comes into question.
POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Along with improved labour market participation rates, the Europe 
2020 strategy aims for a Europe where fewer citizens are at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, with the objective of reducing the num-
ber at risk by 20 million. In the EU-27, Eurostat data shows that the 
proportion of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion has 
been reduced from 25.7 per cent to 24.4 per cent since 2005. Yet this 
















BG 10.4 HR 0.9 BE -2.1
DK 3.6 LV -1.0 CZ -1.4
DE 3.6 HU 0.4 EE -1.2
FR 2.4 MT 0.9 LT -1.7
LU 3.9 AT 0.7 NL -1.8
RO 3.0 SI 0.6 PL -4.9
SE 1.5 FI -0.6 SK -2.0
UK -4.4
Source: Eurostat.
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is still 1.1 per cent higher than the lowest figure recorded in the past 
decade: 23.3 per cent in 2009. Since 2009, the number of people 
at risk has grown: from approximately 114 million to 121 million 
citizens. Like the ambition for employment participation, this is now 
a target in reverse.
The increase in poverty and social exclusion can be dated from 
2009 in the wake of the financial crisis and the beginnings of the 
eurozone debt crisis. Table 3.5 shows that out of the EU-27, only the 
six highlighted countries have experienced reductions in the number 
of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion. Furthermore, only 
three of these countries have experienced significant reductions 
Figure 3.4 At-risk poverty and social exclusion rates and the Europe 2020 target. 
Source: Eurostat.
Table 3.5 Change in the proportion at risk of poverty or social exclusion: 
2009–13
EU-27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV
% change 1.1 0.6 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.3 0.1 4.3 8.1 2.8 -0.4 3.7 5.3 -2.8
LT LU HU MT NL AT PO PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
% change 1.2 1.2 3.9 3.7 0.8 -0.3 -2.0 2.5 -2.7 3.3 0.2 -0.9 0.5 2.8
Source: Eurostat. Note: Data for Ireland from 2009–12.
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in poverty, with the eastern member states of Latvia, Poland and 
Romania recording reductions of two per cent or more. The most 
common experience in the EU is of rising poverty and social exclu-
sion since the crisis. Importantly, the largest rises in poverty have 
come in the member states most affected by austerity: Ireland, 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Portugal all recorded increases of over 
2.5 per cent since 2009, with a significant increase of 8.1 per cent in 
Greece, as welfare provision has been drastically cut back. Notably, 
however, other countries have not been immune from increases 
in poverty: Hungary, Malta and the UK have also seen large and 
expanding poverty rates. 
In addition to increases in the overall risk of poverty, southern 
Europen member states and Ireland have experienced increases in 
severe material deprivation and a growth in child poverty signifi-
cantly above the EU average. Table 3.6 shows that this is particularly 
significant in Greece where the number of children at risk of poverty 
has risen by 12.1 per cent since 2005. In contrast, over the same 
period severe material deprivation has increased far more slowly 
in the north, with no change in the Netherlands, small increases 
in Denmark (+ 0.6) and Germany (+ 0.8), and overall reductions in 
severe deprivation in Finland (-1.3) and Sweden (- 0.9).
While the common experience in the EU is of rising poverty 
rates, the scale of the rise has led to an intensification of the regional 
divides indentified in the previous section. Table 3.7 shows the 
Table 3.6 Change in the proportion of children at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion and overall severe material deprivation: 2005–13
Child Poverty  
(% change)
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proportion of EU populations at risk of poverty and social exclu-
sion. The highest poverty rates are concentrated in the south-east of 
Europe, yet high poverty rates as a whole curve around the continent 
from Europe’s north-east to the south-west. The lowest levels of 
poverty are to be found in northern and western Europe, although 
there are notable exceptions in eastern and central Europe: the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, for instance, both have poverty rates below 
20 per cent; with much lower levels of median wages, on relative 
measures of poverty, these countries do reasonably well. 
These findings are underlined in a paper by Zsolt Darvas and Olga 
Tschekassin for the Bruegel thinktank in Brussels.7 The authors 
conclude: ‘While the fall in severely deprived elderly people is a 
highly welcome development, more children were severely deprived 
even in 2013 than in 2007, which is worrying.’ They also empha-
sise the sharp differences between countries in their experience of 
rising material deprivation: ‘Before the crisis, material deprivation 
was very high but declining in the member states that joined the 
EU in 2004–07. During the crisis, there were major increases in the 
Baltic states after 2008, and after 2010 in the three euro-area pro-
gramme countries (Greece, Portugal and Ireland) and in Italy and 
Spain. In the other EU15 countries there was only a minor increase 
and even a slight decline in central and eastern European countries. 
These developments suggest that the east-west divide has narrowed, 
while the north-south divide has widened with the crisis.’
Table 3.7 EU-wide variation in those at risk of poverty or social exclusion (pro-
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30 INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
SUMMARY
Europe faces common challenges in combating inequality and pov-
erty. Inequality as a whole is rising within the eurozone, and there is 
no region in Europe that is wholly exempt from these trends. States 
such as Denmark, Germany and Sweden, which are otherwise high 
performers in terms of economic growth and employment rates, 
have experienced rising inequality since 2008. On poverty and social 
exclusion, the vast majority of EU countries have also seen poverty 
risks increase since the on-set of the financial crisis. As a result, 
the objective of the Europe 2020 strategy to reduce the number of 
citizens at risk of poverty by 20 million looks set not to be met.
That said, Europe was divided in relation to poverty and inequality 
well before the crisis. Yet trends on poverty have been significantly 
worse in more austerity-hit countries, especially Greece. This has 
widened the increase in poverty rates across Europe, despite the 
efforts most member states have made to contain such an increase. 
Along with the harsh facts of falling incomes and declining employ-
ment rates, the increased risk of poverty in many southern states is 
another crucial factor accounting for the vast movement of people 
to countries elsewhere in Europe with all of the political and social 
ramifications that rapid migration entails.
NOTES
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atic’, Bank of England, 27 May 2014, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Pages/speeches/2014/731.aspx.
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Europe has historically enjoyed among the best-funded and most 
high-performing public services in the world. The long-term impact 
of the crisis is further transforming systems of public service provi-
sion in Europe, however, as budgets are constrained and demands 
rise in the face of changing demography and new technologies, 
particularly in the fields of health and education. There are some 
who question whether existing arrangements for delivering public 
services can survive, and whether there will have to be a further 
phase of radical institutional reform across Europe. The debate about 
the sustainability of European welfare states was well underway 
before the crisis: with the fiscal pressures on many member states 
having increased as a result of the crisis, the debate is set to intensify 
further. 
EUROPE 2020 TARGETS ON EDUCATION
Along with its targets on employment participation and poverty 
risks, the Europe 2020 strategy aims for two specific objectives in 
education. Those were first proposed by the Barroso Commission 
in 2010 and then endorsed by the European council and parliament:
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1. A reduction in the rates of early school leaving to 10 per cent in the EU.
2. At least 40 per cent of 30–34 year-olds completing tertiary level 
education.
In the context of a youth unemployment crisis in many EU 
member states, the early school leaving target has taken on 
enhanced significance. Young Europeans are increasingly at risk of 
joblessness and social exclusion; ensuring that more young people 
stay on at school for longer is seen as a key protective measure as 
that group seeks to make a smooth transition into the labour market, 
training or further education. 
On this indicator, there is generally positive news across Europe. 
Despite the economic crises, the early school leaving rate has been 
reduced year-on-year since 2005, with Europe set to achieve the 
target of reducing the rate to an average of 10 per cent across the 
EU (Figure 4.1). Indeed, many countries have now long surpassed 
the 10 per cent target, while only Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal and 
Romania have rates above 15 per cent.1 This indicates a degree of 
diversity amid the overall positive trends in Europe, with the UK 
Figure 4.1 Early school leaving rates and the Europe 2020 target. Source: 
Eurostat.
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unusual in experiencing an increase in early school leavers between 
2005 and 2013 of 0.5 per cent. However, even in those countries 
where school leaving rates remain relatively high, significant prog-
ress has been made since 2005: Portugal, for example, has reduced 
its early school leaving rate by 19.4 per cent, while Malta has done 
so by 12.2 per cent. Table 4.2 shows that since 2005, only three 
countries have experienced increases in the early leaving rate – 
Poland, Slovakia and the UK; while important to note, these are 
nevertheless extremely small changes at less than one per cent.
Similar progress has been made on the EU’s tertiary educa-
tion target of 40 per cent completion for all 30–34 year-olds. 
The proportion of Europe’s population completing tertiary edu-
cation increased significantly by just under nine per cent since 
2005. In 2013, 37 per cent of 30–34 year-olds in Europe had 
completed tertiary education, with the 2020 objective on course 
to be achieved. Again, many countries have already reached the 
target, with some member states – including Ireland, Lithuania and 
Luxembourg – surpassing 50 per cent tertiary participation. Signifi-
cant challenges remain, however, for some member states, with a 
varying range of countries – as diverse as the Czech Republic, Italy 
and Austria – with less than 30 per cent of citizens completing ter-
tiary education. There are major challenges for those countries that 
lag behind the more successful performers. Austria and Germany’s 
labour market model is far more dependent on vocational education 
and training than the ‘mass participation’ higher education model of 
member states. Countries such as Germany and Austria retain a sig-
nificant manufacturing sector and are characterised by corporatist 
Table 4.2 Change in the proportion of early school leavers: 2005–13
EU-27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV
% change -3.8 -1.9 -7.9 -0.6 -0.7 -3.6 -4.3 -4.1 -3.5 -7.4 -2.5 -5.3 -9.1 -4.6
LT LU HU MT NL AT PO PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
% change -2.1 -7 -0.7 -12.2 -4.3 -1.8 0.3 -19.4 -2.3 -1.0 0.1 -1.0 -3.7 0.8
Source: Eurostat.
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arrangements with a high level of co-ordination between govern-
ment, employers and trade unions – all conducive to maintaining 
high-quality vocational training systems. 
Nevertheless, although some states have far more advanced 
tertiary education systems than others, progress within the EU as 
a whole has been marked. Table 4.4 shows that all countries in the 
EU-27 have achieved increases in tertiary education completion 
since 2005. Countries from across all European regions have made 
notable improvements, including those in austerity-hit countries 
such as Ireland (13.4 per cent), Greece (9.6 per cent) and Portugal 
(12.5 per cent). However, the endemic weaknesses in the southern 
labour markets means that many of those who successfully com-
plete higher education must look elsewhere in Europe for work. 
The dilemma for these countries is whether to invest in higher 
education expansion when many graduates are likely to migrate 
elsewhere.
Europe’s achievements in education buck the trend when com-
pared to the problems many countries have experienced with 
inequality and poverty, as well as the more rapid decline in living 
Figure 4.3 Tertiary education targets and the Europe 2020 target. Source: 
Eurostat.
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standards experienced in Europe’s austerity-hit southern periphery. 
However, austerity itself may account for some of the improvement 
in reducing the early school leaving age: with fewer job and training 
opportunities, increasing numbers of young people might decide to 
stay on at school to improve skills and qualifications. Unless that 
growing number of young people who stay on at school have access 
to jobs and opportunities, it is not clear that the drive to reduce the 
early leaving age alone will be of benefit. 
A similar debate also emerges regarding the utility of mass higher 
education in countries with high rates of youth unemployment. 
A valid question is the extent to which higher education is appro-
priate for young people who are otherwise destined to endure poor 
labour market prospects. There is also a question of quality in terms 
of the relationship between formal educational attainment and actual 
skill levels. OECD work suggests that literacy scores for individuals 
with tertiary education vary considerably between member states.2 
This reflects a wider problem of basic literacy skills. While overall 
there is less inequality in literacy scores according to educational 
attainment levels between Europe and America, mean literacy 
scores within the EU differ widely between member states: in Italy 
and Spain, for example, the mean literacy score is some 10 per cent 
below that in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Furthermore, the advances made in tertiary education participa-
tion are largely due to policy changes and expenditure plans put in 
place long before the financial crisis. It will not be clear until the 
end of the decade whether or not tertiary education participation 
Table 4.4 Change in the proportion of those completing tertiary education: 
2005–13
EU-27 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV
% change 8.9 3.6 4.5 13.7 0.3 7 12.0 13.4 9.6 2.4 6.4 5.4 7 22.2
LT LU HU MT NL AT PO PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
% change 13.6 14.9 14.0 8.4 8.2 6.8 17.8 12.5 11.4 15.5 12.6 1.4 10.7 13.0
Source: Eurostat.
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rates – akin to incomes and living standards – have been signifi-
cantly affected by the downturn. Figure 4.5 shows that, at least until 
2011, the majority of countries continued to invest in education. 
Between 2005 and 2011, only eight countries – six of which are in 
eastern Europe – had reduced the amount that governments spend 
on public education. Notably, increases were highest in some of 
the most crisis-hit countries such as Ireland, Cyprus and Spain. 
However, more recent figures, drawn by Bruegel from the Eurostat 
database of general government expenditure by function, point to a 
more troubling picture of post-crisis developments (Table 4.6). 
Public spending in education has been reduced significantly 
between 2009 and 2012 in the crisis-hit countries: by seven per cent 
in the Baltic states, 10 per cent in Italy and Spain and 14 per cent in 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the same period, expenditure rose 
by five per cent in the rest of the EU15 and by eight per cent in the 
other central and eastern European countries. OECD research has 
demonstrated no clear relationship between spending on education 
Figure 4.5 Percentage change in expenditure on public education as a propor-
tion of GDP: 2005–11. Source: Eurostat.
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as a proportion of GDP and educational outcomes.5 For all that, if 
this trend were sustained in the medium term, it would be remark-
able if the divergences in educational attainment and skills capabili-
ties that are already a critical factor affecting competitiveness did 
not widen. 
HEALTH AND WELLBEING
A major indicator of quality of life and social wellbeing is health. 
Europe has had one of the healthiest populations in the world in 
the postwar era, with infant mortality rates significantly below, 
Table 4.6 General government expenditure by function, percentage change 
2009–12 (in current prices and constant exchange rates)3












Total general govt 
expenditure
100 4 -12 1 6 -3 7
Interest payments 5 23 14 32 19 164 22
Broad services 17 -2 -12 -11 2 -15 -1
Economic affairs 9 -5 -45 5 -6 -20 -4
Environment 
protection
2 -5 -26 -8 -4 -6 21
Health, recreation 17 4 -20 -7 8 -6 12
Education 11 2 -14 -10 5 -7 8
Old age 20 10 0 8 10 15 13
Family and 
children
4 0 -19 -10 3 -14 1
Housing 1 12 -30 6 13 23 20
Unemployment 4 0 11 14 -5 13 -11
Sickness and 
disability
6 7 -7 -1 9 -5 12
Other social 
protection
5 7 -11 5 9 26 8
Memorandum: 
inflation
8 6 8 7 12 10
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat data.4
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and life expectancies significantly higher, than are the case in the 
United States. Nonetheless, one of the most important measures of 
health – life expectancy at birth – shows significant variation across 
the EU. In general, the highest life expectancies for men and women 
are found in western Europe, with Spain achieving the highest 
female life expectancy of 85.5, and Sweden the highest male life 
expectancy of 79.9. At the other end of the scale, eastern Europe 
has the lowest levels of life expectancy: 77.9 for women in Bulgaria 
and 68.4 for men in Lithuania (Table 4.7). Similarly, for subjective 
wellbeing – an increasingly popular measure of social progress – 
Europe also displays a parallel divide.6 Average life satisfaction in 
Europe varies from a high of 8.0 in the Nordic countries to a low 
of 5.4 in the south-eastern Europe.7 On both these objective and 
subjective measures of health and wellbeing, Europe is overwhelm-
ingly divided between its east and west rather than its north and 
south. Furthermore, longitudinal data from the European Social 
Survey show that of the two southern countries for which data are 
available – Portugal and Spain – average life satisfaction has been 
unchanged since 2008, indicating that economic factors might have 
a less significant impact on happiness levels.
Despite significant health inequalities in Europe, countries in the 
east have made significant progress over the past decade. For the life 
expectancy of men – where the divide is far larger between the 
west and east compared to that of women – the biggest gains in 
life expectancy since 2005 have been achieved in eastern Europe. 
Table 4.7 Highest and lowest female/male life expectancy: 2012








Spain – 85.5 Bulgaria – 77.9 Sweden – 79.9 Lithuania – 68.4
France – 85.4 Romania – 78.1 Italy – 79.8 Latvia – 68.9
Italy – 84.8 Hungary – 78.7 Spain – 79.5 Bulgaria – 70.9
Luxembourg – 83.8 Latvia – 78.9 Netherlands – 79.3 Romania – 71.0
Finland – 83.7 Lithuania – 79.6 Luxembourg/UK – 79.1 Estonia – 71.4
Source: Eurostat.
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The four largest increases in male life expectancy up to 2012 were in 
Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania (Figure 4.8). Such progress 
is notably high; in Latvia, for example, where male life expectancy 
increased four years in just one seven-year period. Each country 
in the EU saw male life expectancy rise between 2005 and 2012. 
However, some countries might be expected to have performed 
better. Poland, for example, given its buoyant economy, saw male 
life expectancy increase by just 1.9 years. The evidence is that it 
takes more than economic growth to boost life expectancy, includ-
ing investment in public healthcare and action to reduce unhealthy 
behaviours.
According to the OECD social expenditure database, health 
expenditure in Europe has remained relatively stable during the 
crisis, though the Bruegel paper referred to above suggests a more 
worrying picture. Health spending in Greece, Portugal and Ireland 
was 20 per cent lower in 2012 than it was in 2009. It was seven 
per cent lower in Italy and Spain. At the same time it grew by eight 
per cent in the rest of the EU15 and 12 per cent in central and eastern 
European member states (apart from the Baltics). 
Figure 4.8 Change in male life expectancy: 2005–12. Source: Eurostat.
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However, as with education, it is unlikely that such data reveals 
the full extent of how the crisis has affected health outcomes. 
The consensus of public health experts, typified in David Stuckler 
and Sanjay Basu’s critique of austerity policies’ health effects, 
The Body Economic, is that the crisis has led to a major rise in health 
problems in austerity-hit countries, including suicide, depression 
and infant mortality.8 In Greece, for example, the crisis has been 
linked to a rise in HIV infections and malaria. 
SUMMARY
On education, the EU is moving successfully towards meeting the 
Europe 2020 targets of reducing the number of early school leav-
ers and increasing those achieving tertiary level qualifications. On 
health, large inequalities continue to exist between Europe’s east 
and west, although increases in life expectancy have been strongest 
in countries such as Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia. 
Nevertheless, on both health and education, the true impact of the 
crisis is in all likelihood not yet fully apparent in existing official 
EU data. It will take some time, for example, to determine whether 
the crisis has affected tertiary education attainment or had an effect 
on life expectancy trajectories. Epidemiological evidence points to a 
number of health crises in European states, particularly in those such 
as Greece, where the effects of austerity have been most acutely felt. 
This will continue to pose significant challenges to Europe’s public 
health and education systems. 
NOTES
1. Early school leaving rates are below 10 per cent in: Czech Republic 
(5.4); Denmark (8.0); Germany (9.9); Estonia (9.7); Ireland (8.4); France 
(9.7); Croatia (4.5); Cyprus (9.1); Latvia (9.8); Lithuania (6.3); Luxembourg 
(6.1); Netherlands (9.2); Austria (7.3); Poland (5.6); Slovenia (3.9); 
Slovakia (6.4); Finland (9.3); and Sweden (7.1).
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2. OECD (2014), Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators, Paris: 
OECD.
3. Belgium, Croatia, Slovakia and Romania are not included because 
of lack of data; data reported for the aggregate of the remaining 24 coun-
tries of the EU (EU24). 10 other EU15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. 10 other central and 
east European states: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta. For the Baltic states, the 
2008–12 period is shown, because fiscal consolidation started earlier in 
these countries. The aggregates for countries with different currencies were 
calculated using constant exchange rates (the average of 2009–13) and 
therefore exchange rate fluctuations do not affect the values shown. Broad 
services include: general public services except interest payments, defence, 
public order and safety and community amenities.
4. Table 2 from Darvas, Z. and Tschekassin, O. (2015), Poor and Under 
Pressure: The Social Impact of Europe’s Fiscal Consolidation, Brussels: 
Bruegel.
5. OECD (2014), Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators, Paris: 
OECD.
6. See Legatum Institute (2014), Legatum Prosperity Index, London: 
Legatum Institute. 
7. European Social Survey 2012.
8. Stuckler, D. and Basu, S. (2013), The Body Economic: Why Austerity 
Kills, London: Allen Lane.
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This chapter examines the impact of changing social realities in 
Europe on society and politics. In particular, it considers whether the 
economic pressures and austerity which are increasingly dividing 
Europe may, in turn, be fomenting the growth of populist parties 
on left and right which represent a fundamental challenge to the 
established political order of postwar Europe.
THE RISE OF POPULISM
The previous sections of this report indicate that the Europe of 2015 
is increasingly divided and that the traditional engine of European 
convergence has gone into reverse. The risk is of an ever-more 
polarised Europe which is drifting apart, calling into question the 
basic tenets of the political project of European integration. On the 
one hand, there is the old division between east and west. Eastern 
Europe remains a considerably poorer region than western Europe, 
while life expectancy rates still appear to be from different conti-
nents. Yet, on many measures, eastern European countries have had 
a ‘good crisis’. Income and economic growth has been strong in 
places, especially Poland, while many states show signs of ‘catching 
up’ with the west on health and education.
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On the other hand, there is the re-emergence of an old division – 
between north and south among original member states – which, in 
the run up to the crisis, had long been assumed to be shrinking as 
a result of a process of economic integration driving convergence. 
Instead, the years of convergence between the north and south up to 
2008 have given way to a new divergence in Europe. Economic and 
income growth, as well as measures of deprivation and poverty, have 
gone in opposing directions. In western Europe, there is an increas-
ingly successful core, centred in and around Germany, and a periph-
eral south, exemplified at its most extreme by the profound decline 
of Greece. And, despite the impressive growth figures recorded by 
the UK in the last two years, the stagnation in living standards and 
productivity, if it continues, represents an important challenge to the 
Anglo-liberal model of economic growth.1 In the north of Europe 
then, despite the ongoing weaknesses of the broader eurozone, there 
is a case to be made that the source of economic strength and influ-
ence has shifted too: across the North Sea from the UK to Germany. 
This is a structural economic shift in Germany’s favour. 
As the economic crisis has gradually abated, the new Europe 
emerging from it is giving way to sharp and deeply worrying politi-
cal developments and social tensions. The expansion of the EU to the 
east, combined with the relative and in some cases absolute decline 
so evident in the south, has given birth to new political forces. It has 
reinforced the growth of populism that predates 2008.
Prior to the crisis, many imagined that the growth of populism 
was in strong part a reaction to the success of European economic 
integration, with the growth of tensions between its ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, often characterised in inevitably simplistic terms such as the 
division between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘communitarians’. 
The first high-profile successes of rightwing populism were those 
of the Freedom party in Austria joining a centre-right led coalition 
in 1999; the Pim Fortuyn insurgency in the Netherlands in 2001, 
followed by the later success of Geert Wilders’s party; and Jean-
Marie Le Pen’s National Front forcing the Socialist candidate, 
Lionel Jospin, into third place defeat in the first round of the French 
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presidential election in 2002. This was followed in 2005 by the 
shock rejection of the draft EU constitutional treaty in referenda 
in France and the Netherlands, two of the founding states of the 
common market. Yet the consequences of the crisis have been for 
populism to rise to a new level, shaking the very foundations of 
the established party system across the south and heightening the 
populist reaction in the north. 
Table 5.1 demonstrates how across Europe so-called populist 
parties rose to prominence in the 2014 European parliament elec-
tions. It is, of course, important to emphasise several points about 
these results. As even the European parliament’s strongest admirers 
admit, it barely touches the lives of its electorate, even though its 
powers are now considerable: as a consequence, elections to the 
parliament are a natural vehicle for protest votes. Second, even then, 
about 70 per cent of the MEPs elected in 2014 can still be catego-
rised as strong supporters of European integration – the UK is a rare 
exception here. 
Even so, in the 2014 European parliament elections, while some 
parties came from the left, such as Syriza and Podemos, and others 
are hard to classify (for example, Italy’s Five Star Movement), 
the vast majority of electoral gains made by populists came from 
the right.2 In three major western European countries – Denmark, 






Denmark People’s party 26.6 Netherlands Party for 
Freedom
13.3
UK Ukip 26.6 Finland Finn’s party 12.9
Greece Syriza 26.6 Sweden Sweden 
Democrats
9.7
France National Front 24.9 Greece Golden Dawn 9.4
Italy Five Star 
Movement
21.2 Spain Podemos 8.0
Austria Freedom party 19.7 Poland Congress of the 
New Right
7.2
Hungary Jobbik 14.7 Germany AfD 7.0
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the UK and France – rightwing populists topped the popular vote in 
those elections.
Many of these political parties, including those on the left, derive 
their support from citizens who are increasingly disillusioned with 
the EU. The reasons for this disillusion vary whether for its pur-
ported lack of democratic accountability, its association with the 
free movement of labour and the link in the public mind to down-
ward pressure on wages, or the imposition of austerity policies in 
southern Europe. Austerity in particular appears to have driven 
support for both the populist left and right in Europe. In the south, 
the experience of austerity has driven voters towards parties deter-
mined to scale austerity back, while many voters in the north feel 
they have paid too high a price for profligacy on the Mediterranean. 
In addition to dissatisfaction with European institutions, populists 
also gather support from other growing resentments closer to home: 
most notably hostility towards political parties of the centre left and 
centre right that are perceived as incapable of ‘making a difference’ 
and the domination of political life by a narrow, professionalised 
and technocratic political class, which in some countries is also seen 
as corrupt.
However, even in the southern member states most hard hit by 
the crisis, while there is clear evidence of massive discontent with 
the established party system, there is no common pattern of electoral 
realignment. In Greece, the national elections of February 2015 
confirmed the remarkable success of Syriza, a disparate coalition 
of traditional far-left parties and a broader anti-austerity movement. 
The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), the main governing 
party of the democratic left since the restoration of democracy, has 
virtually collapsed. Yet Syriza faces a difficult, perhaps impossible 
task in holding together its majority. It has to secure some relief 
from austerity from its eurozone partners, while at the same time 
meeting the strong wish of the Greek electorate to remain a member 
of the euro. 
Italy, paradoxically, has seen the strongest rise in Euroscepti-
cism, with the main opposition parties on the right and far left 
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calling into question Italy’s membership of the euro, together with 
the remarkable emergence of the anti-political establishment Five 
Star Movement. Yet Italy is governed by a charismatic insurgent 
from within the structures of the Democratic party, Matteo Renzi, 
who won a relatively open party primary and whose rhetoric is one 
of bold reform. His strength of character, mixed with optimistic 
expectations that his force of will can engender some economic 
recovery, appears for the moment to stand in the way of what 
could be a wider collapse of confidence in the Italian political 
system.
The situation in Spain is different again. The established party 
system is challenged as never before since the democratic transition 
from Francoism in the 1970s. The standing of both the centre-right 
Popular party (PP) and the centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
party (PSOE) has fallen dramatically in the polls. There is a sense 
that the electorate blames the traditional parties as much for Spain’s 
economic difficulties as it does Brussels for its externally imposed 
austerity. In this vacuum, separatism has strengthened in Catalonia, 
adding to PSOE’s difficulties as the national party most sensitive to 
Catalan nationalist sentiment, but at the same time totally unwilling 
to support Catalan independence. Second, new challenger parties 
have emerged. Podemos’s leadership represents a leftist, ‘middle-
class academic’, rejection of the existing casta of the party system. 
But, at the grassroots level, it has attracted as much as 20 per cent 
electoral support from those radicalised by Spain’s extreme auster-
ity, particularly young indignados having to live with a massive rise 
in generational inequalities. But PSOE in Spain is not fully compa-
rable to Pasok in Greece. Its hold on power, through the multiple 
tiers of Spanish democracy, reinforced by an electoral system that, 
for the national parliament, exhibits a two-party bias, could prove 
more resilient. PSOE has elected a new young leader who may be 
able to reassert its appeal sufficient for it to maintain its position as 
the first or second party of the state. 
With the notable exception of Greece and Spain, however, the 
left in the wider EU has failed to capitalise on the crisis in the 
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same way as the right. This is exemplified by the performance 
of green parties in the European parliamentary elections. Only in 
Portugal were they particularly successful, with the Democratic 
Unitarian Coalition and the Earth party winning a combined share 
of the vote close to 20 per cent. This fits into the broader pattern 
of growth in the radical left across Europe’s southern periphery. 
However, the wider picture of green performance in Europe has 
been one of stagnation. In European parliament elections in 2014, 
most countries saw no change in the number of green MEPs, while 
any gains made by green parties were cancelled out by equivalent 
losses.
Still, the rise of radical and populist right and left parties is 
fracturing the support of the traditional social democratic and con-
servative parties. The emergence of populists in many guises is 
challenging the hegemony that parties of the centre left and centre 
right have enjoyed in Europe since the second world war. While 
there are slightly more governments led by the right than the left in 
Europe, political parties of the centre are increasingly forced to work 
together in coalition governments. Only three EU states had one-
party majorities at the time of writing: Malta, Slovakia and Spain. 
Figure 5.2 Green party performance in the 2014 European parliament elections. 
Source: Eurostat.
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France might be added to this list given that the Greens have surren-
dered their ministerial posts in the French government, although the 
Socialist party appears to be affected by serious political divisions. 
Once considered temporary, forced responses to electoral arithmetic, 
‘grand’ coalitions that span the two wings of the centre are seen as 
increasingly the norm. In coalitions led by the centre right in both 
Germany and the Netherlands, social democratic ministers occupy 
key positions of influence over policy. And, in the future, grand 
coalitions might be seen as fundamental in holding back the populist 
tide across Europe.
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS 
IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH
The rise of radical, populist forces poses a profound challenge to 
Europe’s traditional political parties, national political institutions 
and the wider EU. And while citizens in the north are increasingly 
attracted to the Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant parties of the right, the 
turn to the left by citizens in the south appears to represent a more 
fundamental, and widespread, malaise towards existing democratic 
institutions. The ire in the south is aimed at both Brussels and the 
perceived cooperation of national governments with the imposition 
of austerity. 
Figure 5.4 shows the extent of feelings of trust in the EU in the 
continental, Nordic and southern regions of Europe.3 In 2005, during 
the heady days of the economic boom, the southern countries had the 
Table 5.3 Governments in Europe: March 2015
One-party majorities Malta (L); Slovakia (L); Spain (R).
Left-leaning coalition 
governments
Austria; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; France; 




Belgium; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Estonia; Finland; Germany; 
Hungry; Ireland; Latvia; Netherlands; Poland; 
Portugal; UK.
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highest levels of trust in the EU. This is unsurprising: membership 
of the union and the single currency were delivering a seemingly 
interminable rise in prosperity and living standards. Trust in the 
EU peaked in 2007 before starting to decline in all three regions. 
Yet the scale of lost trust is far greater in the southern countries. 
In 2014, 43 per cent and 36 per cent of citizens in the Nordic and 
continental regions trusted the EU. The corresponding figure in the 
south was just 24 per cent. Meanwhile, in the UK trust in the EU 
has plummeted: from a high of 36 per cent in 2007 to 19 per cent in 
2013. In the UK dislike of Brussels goes along with an increasing 
recognition that it might be in the country’s interests to remain an 
EU member, now that the prospect of an early referendum makes 
this question a real choice, not simply a popularity poll. Nonetheless, 
in both the UK and the austerity-hit countries, the EU faces a deep 
crisis of disillusionment and mistrust. 
The decline in political trust evident in the south does not end 
with the EU. As Sonia Alonso has written for Policy Network, citi-
zens in southern Europe are significantly more concerned about the 
state of democracy in their own countries, too.4 The gap between 
the southern and northern regions in terms of national democratic 
trust and satisfaction has widened considerably since 2002.5 In 2012, 
Figure 5.4 Trust levels towards the EU. Source: Eurobarometer.
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for example, 32 per cent more people in the north had trust in their 
national governments compared to those in the south. In 2002, 
the corresponding difference was just nine per cent. According to 
Alonso, southern Europeans are experiencing a profound feeling 
of ‘democratic breach’; where trust has remained relatively robust 
in the successful north, it is on the verge of collapse in the south of 
Europe. 
The division in trust between the north and south is beginning 
to manifest itself in what Lluis Orriols terms a distinct ‘ideological 
divorce’ in Europe.6 In an analysis of election manifestos, Orriols 
shows a quantitative shift in the ideological direction of parties in 
the north and south. On average, parties in Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain (together with Ireland), have shifted to the left: support-
ing more expansive social policies combined with less intensive 
austerity and extracting some ‘payback’ from the financial sector 
for the post-2007 bailouts. On the other hand, parties in the rest 
of the EU have witnessed a shift, albeit slight, to the right marked 
by lower support for welfare spending and less tolerance of debt, 
deficits and high taxes. It is as if distrust of markets encouraged by 
the financial crisis has driven even deeper distrust towards the role 
of governments. This has made the political landscape increasingly 
inhospitable for social democratic parties. Such evidence underlines 
how the diverging success of the populists – the radical left in the 
south and the radical right in the north – is filtering through to the 
policy proposals of the mainstream centre. At many levels then – 
citizens, populists and traditional parties – post-crisis Europe is 
being exposed to changing political winds.
Table 5.5 The trust gap in democracy between the north and south: 2002–12
2002 2012
Trust in government (% gap between 
north and south)
9 32
Trust in political parties 6 25
Satisfaction with democracy 6 25
Source: Alonso (2013), derived from Eurobarometer.
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SUMMARY
The politics of post-crisis Europe is very different to that of the 
recent past. In the northern countries, many voters – disillusioned 
with the EU, immigration and the bailing out of the south – have 
shifted their support to the rising parties of the radical right. Populist 
right parties enhanced their support at the 2014 European parlia-
ment elections, with victories in the popular vote in countries such 
as France and the UK. In the south, the situation is vastly different. 
The radical, anti-austerity left has gained in prominence, with the 
rise of Syriza, Podemos and the success of radical, green-leaning 
parties in the Portuguese European elections. In these countries, 
traditional social democratic parties face an existential. In the rest of 
Europe, the greens and the radical left have failed to capitalise on the 
crisis, a symptom of northern Europe’s underlying shift to the right. 
The political scientist Peter Mair reflected on the ongoing decline 
of the centre in his 2013 book, Ruling the Void, which demonstrated 
how citizens had withdrawn their allegiance – and interest – from 
mainstream political parties. Mair contended that such parties had 
similarly neglected the question of citizens’ democratic rights.7 
In the light of recent political developments in Europe, Mair’s 
opening lines issue a stark warning to parties of the centre left:
The age of party democracy has passed. Although the parties them-
selves remain, they have become so disconnected from the wider 
society, and pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in mean-
ing, that they no longer seem capable of sustaining democracy in its 
present form.
There are other significant attitudinal divisions in the new politics 
of Europe, driven in part by differing views on the trustworthi-
ness of political institutions and satisfaction with democracy itself. 
Citizens in the south are now far more sceptical than those in the 
north when it comes to both the EU and their national governments, 
something that is driving support for anti-establishment movements 
such as Syriza. This is accompanied by a quantitative change in the 
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ideological character of politics in the north and south of Europe: 
where parties in the former have moved rightwards, those in the 
latter have tended to shift towards the left. This further empha-
sises the extent to which new political cleavages and divisions are 
emerging across Europe, further undermining the historic goal of 
long-term integration.
NOTES
1. Hay, C. (2013), The Failure of Anglo-liberal Capitalism, London: 
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Simón of Politikon; Andrés Ortega; José Fernández Albertos of CSIC; 
José Moisés Martín Carretero; José Moisés Martín Carretero of PSOE; and 
David Mathieson.
3. Continental (Austria; Belgium; France; Germany; Netherlands); 
Nordic (Denmark; Finland; Sweden); southern (Greece; Italy; Portugal; 
Cyprus; Spain).
4. Alonso, S. ‘A Perfect Storm: Europe’s Growing North-South Divide’, 
Policy Network, 12 September 2013, http://www.policy-network.net/
pno_detail.aspx?ID=4459&title=A-perfect-storm-Europes-growing-North-
South-divide.
5. Alonso defines the northern grouping as Germany, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Austria.
6. Orriols, L. ‘The Ideological Divorce in Europe’, El Diario, 12 June 
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As this report demonstrates, the eurozone crisis and consequent 
economic fall-out has consolidated and fundamentally intensified 
a divide between the stronger northern economies and the weaker 
southern ones. At the same time, some of the former communist 
states in eastern Europe – particularly Poland – have continued to 
thrive despite the crisis, enjoying rapidly rising living standards 
and new-found prosperity. Europe is increasingly a continent of 
division: of growth versus stagnation; rising real incomes versus 
falling real incomes; impressive jobs growth versus markedly higher 
unemployment. The depth of this divide and its social and political 
consequences pose major questions about the future viability of the 
European project. 
Of course, the new reality north-south polarisations should not 
obscure the continuing reality of social problems across the entire 
EU. In many member states, rich and poor alike, the crisis has 
deepened inequality as conventionally measured and it is not just 
in the south that generational inequalities have sharpened. The poli-
tics of most member states since 2008 have prioritised the needs of 
older voters over young people and families with children. Even in 
countries with high levels of employment, the problems caused by 
insecurity and low pay, particularly in more flexible labour markets, 
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appear to be growing. What is new, however, is the sharp social 
division between north and south accentuating political tensions and 
cleavages. 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
In recent years, one of the more notable effects of Europe’s growing 
inequality is the migration of young people from the south to the 
north, with hundreds of thousands of young people from Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain escaping the misery of rampant youth 
unemployment. This is driven, in turn, by the significant increase 
in youth exclusion, poverty and material deprivation. Meanwhile, 
member states from across the EU are struggling to hold back the 
tide of rising inequality. 
The social situation in the EU is not entirely negative. As this 
report reveals, progress has continued towards meeting headline 
Europe 2020 education targets, while the generally improving 
position of Europe’s elderly is to be welcomed. Nor should one 
exaggerate the bleakness of the economic picture. In many states, 
unemployment has remained relatively low. Countries like the UK, 
for example, have experienced nothing like the mass job losses 
of the 1980s and 1990s: rather there has been a robust growth in 
employment. Similarly in the eurozone, the risk of a further bank 
collapse and government sector debt defaults has largely subsided: 
overall, growth is returning, the balance of payments position is rela-
tively strong and there has been a significant relaxation of austerity. 
Ireland and Spain are now enjoying steady growth and it appeared 
in early 2015 that even Greece could be turning the corner with the 
prospect of some growth and a primary budget surplus at last being 
achieved. A degree of post-crisis stability in Europe has been estab-
lished, anaemic and conditional though it currently appears.
However, the research presented in this report reveals the extent 
of the rapid and steep fall in living standards in the south. This risks 
a permanent impoverishment of countries like Greece and Portugal, 
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in which wages are ‘reset’ to much lower levels, and populations 
learn to live with permanently higher levels of unemployment. 
But, for compelling political and social reasons, the extent of such 
divergence is clearly unsustainable, especially given that Europe 
once aspired to social and economic convergence.
Referring to the unequal distribution of GDP per person across 
many regions of the EU, some informed observers, such as the 
economics commentator Paul Mason, argue that the European 
dream of convergence has comprehensively failed: the aim was 
for the wealth of more prosperous regions – from the north of Italy 
through to Scandinavia – to gradually disperse or ‘trickle down’ to 
the poorer south and, eventually, the east.1 In his view, the crisis 
appears to have stalled this ambition, potentially sounding its death 
knell. While the success in central Europe, most notably of Poland, 
does not necessarily confirm Mason’s arguments, the situation in 
Greece and Italy remains of great concern. 
In addition, the increase in social and economic inequalities in 
Europe is now profoundly affecting citizens’ views of European 
society, political institutions and the democratic mandate of their 
own governments and the EU. As Alonso suggests, people in the 
south are rapidly losing trust in governments, political parties and 
democracy itself.2 This is leading to a ‘new economic and territo-
rial cleavage in Europe between north and south’. Diverging living 
standards are increasingly splitting Europe apart: within this context, 
Europe’s grandest ideal – solidarity as expressed in the imprecise 
but nonetheless resonant goal of ‘social cohesion’ – is not easy to 
restore. The growing divide between Europe’s regions is arguably 
the most dangerous fault line in European politics today.
POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS
As a consequence of Europe’s new social and economic divides, it is 
increasingly clear that there are continuing political ramifications 
to the crisis, with the status quo under considerable pressure from 
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electorates everywhere. This was in evidence during the European 
parliamentary elections in 2014, when the nature of the political 
divisions were laid bare: not between social democrats and conser-
vatives, but between a contracting core in support of the European 
consensus and an expanding periphery, from both the populist left 
and right, rallying against it. This is so substantial and significant 
that it can no longer be dismissed as a ‘fringe’.
The rejection of the status quo reached a crescendo in January 
2015 with the election of Syriza in Greece, just two seats short of an 
overall majority. It was elected on an electoral platform that explic-
itly rejected the austerity consensus, and called instead for measures 
to boost public spending, halt privatisation and renegotiate Greek 
debt. Syriza also promised to keep Greece in the euro. In addition 
to Greece, in Portugal, various left parties are challenging the old 
regime of Socialists and Social Democrats. In Spain, Podemos, now 
advised by the economist Thomas Piketty, along with a new centre 
party, Ciudadanos, presents an unprecedented challenge to the estab-
lished two-party system. One strand in those southern electorates’ 
sense of grievance is the imposition of unending austerity without, 
as they see it, any democratic mandate. The EU is increasingly seen 
as a Europe of those who dictate and those who obey. But in Spain 
this is overlaid by deeper frustrations with the Spanish political 
system and its failure, as Podemos sees it, to address the real prob-
lems affecting citizens. Podemos has gained ground as voters react 
against a series of corruption scandals engulfing both the centre-
left PSOE and centre-right PP. While the coherence of these new 
movements is questionable, as is their ability – as Syriza is quickly 
finding out – to pursue anti-austerity policies while remaining inside 
the EU, they undoubtedly indicate a fundamental challenge to the 
established order in the south.
The rise of a new left in Europe poses a potentially existential 
threat to traditional social democratic parties. Driven both by the 
consolidation of austerity and its seeming acceptance by the social 
democratic centre left, voters are increasingly tempted by radical, 
anti-austerity movements or green parties. In Greece, the rise of 
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Syriza has buried the traditional social democratic party, Pasok, 
while the ability of the PSOE in Spain to form the next government 
is compromised by the transfer of large swathes of its support to 
Podemos. In the UK, the old certainties of the two-party, first-past-
the-post system are replaced by fragmentation as the Green party 
picks up new recruits. In Scotland the Scottish National party has 
successfully positioned itself as an anti-austerity alternative to the 
left of Labour. Ukip on the populist right also appeals to some for-
mer Labour voters.
However, the political reaction in the north is very different to 
the situation in the south of Europe: in northern Europe, populism 
has thrived on the right. Despite the existance of important national 
differences, it is often united by a common hostility towards the 
EU and immigration. Economic and social divergence in Europe 
is fuelling a belief in these member states that the nation-specific 
values – and countries – that built European progress in the imme-
diate aftermath of the second world war now need to be protected. 
In such a vision of national protectionism, there is little scope for 
European solidarity, multiculturalism or the free movement prin-
ciples of the EU’s founding treaties. Radical-right parties have 
successfully exploited these feelings, effectively linking their long-
held political beliefs to the crisis in the EU, winning millions of 
votes as a result.
Importantly for Europe’s social democratic parties, just as they 
risk losing support from younger, liberal and middle-class voters 
to anti-austerity and green parties, there is the parallel risk that 
more socially conservative, working-class voters will change their 
allegiances to the populist right. Nowhere is this phenomenon more 
in evidence than in countries like France and the UK, where the 
anti-immigration National Front and Ukip look to exploit the grow-
ing disillusionment in blue-collar communities. Political scientists 
Matthew Goodwin and Robert Ford call this the problem of the 
‘left behind’: citizens who would traditionally have voted for the 
centre left but feel excluded by globalisation, and are poorer as a 
consequence of the crisis.3
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In addition to the political consequences for social democrats, the 
rise of both forms of populism is heightening explicit social tensions 
across the EU, with the resurgence of divisive cultural stereotypes 
such as the ‘prudent north’ and the ‘profligate south’. Such cultural 
stereotypes are propagated by those who oppose ever-closer union 
on the grounds that unity within an incompatible Europe of differing 
norms, culture and values is an impossible and unrealistic dream. 
Here, southern Europe is conceptualised as a dangerous ‘other’: 
deviant, corrupt, backward. Cultural differences in Europe are 
harder to ignore – and easier to exploit – when economic and social 
fissures exist alongside them. The policy approach of euro bailouts 
and austerity leaves many northern Europeans feeling responsible 
for paying the debts of the south. At the same time it leaves southern 
Europeans feeling powerless in their own countries and at the 
behest of unaccountable EU policymakers. Such divisions leave the 
long-term direction and nature of the European project increasingly 
unclear. 
THE ROAD AHEAD
Yet despite the gravity of these challenges, European politicians, 
policymakers and researchers appear stuck. To the public, years 
have passed in which talk of European ‘growth strategies’ has come 
and gone; yet growth remains anaemic. In the eurozone a significant 
shift in policy may well be taking place. The ECB has embraced an 
ambitious programme of quantitative easing which is holding down 
borrowing costs across the euro area and has led to a significant 
currency depreciation that will strengthen global competitiveness. 
The application of fiscal rules has been eased by the European com-
mission with a more permissive approach being adopted towards 
investment expenditures. And the EU has launched its own invest-
ment plan. These policy shifts have taken place without great fanfare 
because the politics of the eurozone dictate that Germany and other 
northern member states cannot be seen by their own citizens to have 
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made ‘concessions’. Numerous outcomes now seem feasible for 
the future of Europe. One possibility is the continuation of present 
arrangements and policies that, while producing short-term stability, 
rest on an array of economic, social and political fissures which 
threaten to erupt in unpredictable ways. Pro-Europeans hope that 
the centre holds until the prospect of sustainable economic adjust-
ment and recovery returns. Yet while this uneasy stability endures, 
it simultaneously threatens to drive the divisions in Europe to such 
an extent that the union is threatened as a whole. The best-case 
scenario for the present approach is one that contains the economic 
and social crises engulfing the south; the worst-case is one that leads 
to new political crises, continued economic divergence and, perhaps, 
the exit of certain member states from the currency or the EU itself. 
At present, the latter scenario seems just as likely as the first: the 
buoyant southern radicals and northern Eurosceptics will not be 
vanquished by the present trajectory of policy. 
A third possibility is one of much-needed reform and change. 
Mario Monti argues that restoring an economic balance to Europe 
will require a policy of give-and-take between the richer north and 
the poorer south.4 In particular, while the south should accept the 
need for fiscal discipline and structural reform, the north – and espe-
cially Germany – should be willing to identify and support ‘growth-
friendly’ public investment policies. 
This first point made by Monti has often been the position of 
politicians and policymakers from the north. There is, they argue, 
a divergence in the standards of governance between the two poles 
of Europe, which encompasses everything from the quality of the 
civil service to the capability of governments to implement reforms. 
In addition to fixing its governance weaknesses, the south should 
therefore follow the German economic model of labour market 
reform and wage moderation which purportedly accounts for 
Germany’s successful economic performance during the crisis. 
Countering this narrative is the view that the problem lies in the 
approach of the north, particularly laying the blame at Germany’s 
door, with its reluctance to support demand-side policies and 
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stimulus measures elsewhere in the EU. This point is the argument 
of the radical politicians in the south who place the blame for dete-
riorating economic and social conditions at the door of austerity and 
the reluctance of the EU and the ECB to support expansionary poli-
cies. The consequences of this northern consensus can arguably be 
discerned in the findings presented in this report: the socioeconomic 
fracturing of the south and relatively strong income, employment 
and economic growth in the north. There is a sense that the south has 
been sacrificed to support a northern preoccupation – austerity and 
budget discipline – regardless of the economic, social and human 
consequences. On the other hand, the radicals of the south know 
their own societies need reform, which is why they rail against the 
established party system. But they have not, as yet, managed to 
convert that instinct into a coherent political programme of reform. 
This divide in public and political opinion – between pro-austerity 
in the north and anti-austerity in the south – is imposing polarising 
pressures on political parties across the EU: making unity harder 
at the time it is needed most. Ideological currents are moving in 
different directions across the continent. To hold itself together, 
Europe might seek to reconcile these two apparently conflicting 
objectives: to support the reform of political economy in the south, 
while encouraging expansionary measures across Europe to boost 
consumption, investment and growth. Labour market reforms, for 
example, should be accompanied by meaningful job-creation pro-
grammes and higher minimum wages to protect the position of the 
low paid.
Monti insists that, despite the willingness of many southern mem-
ber states to accept fiscal rules of the north, much-needed structural 
reforms have been under-prioritised. This is because structural 
reforms often come up against organised interest groups domesti-
cally, while EU policymakers have been overwhelmingly focused 
on budgetary discipline and not meaningful structural reform. This 
combined effect – of domestic opposition and European myopia – 
has resulted in a lack of structural change. The proposed solution is 
to reorientate EU policy towards country-specific recommendations 
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for reform, and to couple this with mechanisms to facilitate their 
financing. This would be accompanied by targeting research sub-
sidies, infrastructure funding, SME support and innovation invest-
ment at Europe’s most depressed peripheral regions as a matter of 
urgency.5 Such arrangements might help to promote growth and 
employment in struggling member states and strengthen Europe at 
a time when it needs it most. In this new ‘grand bargain’, public 
investment projects would have an important role to play, as the 
newly installed president of the European commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, has recently set out in his €315bn investment programme. 
At the same time, political parties in the south – most notably 
Syriza – are calling for expansionary measures alongside imposed 
structural reforms. The implementation of quantitative easing by the 
ECB is evidence that the tide might be shifting in this direction, as 
high real interest rates in the eurozone as a whole are reduced with 
the aim of boosting growth and private sector activity. The introduc-
tion of QE seems to be an explicit recognition that weak growth, as 
well as pockets of endemic structural unemployment, is hurting the 
legitimacy of the EU as a political project. Anti-austerity parties 
in the south, such as Syriza and Podemos, inevitably feel the EU 
should go further to restore prosperity, arguing for the restructuring 
of debt, and radical social policies such as the introduction of a basic 
income. 
A more comprehensive reform agenda needs to be developed 
further in order to provide a genuine alternative to austerity policies. 
This is not the place to set out such an agenda in detail, but the fol-
lowing ideas ought to be rapidly explored. 
•	 The first point to emphasise is about the availability of national 
policy space given the constraints of austerity. The reality is that 
even in the hard-hit south, there is more room for manoeuvre at 
national level for a positive reform agenda than either the estab-
lished parties have been able to take advantage of, or the new 
challengers have been able to articulate in practical terms. Public 
finances must inevitably remain heavily constrained, but in Greece 
66 CONCLUSION
and Spain, for example, there is scope for tax reform and measures 
to tackle tax evasion which could significantly improve public rev-
enues. Southern welfare states are notoriously inefficient in focus-
ing limited resources on those most in need, largely because of the 
priority they give to pensions: a gradual shift in support to young 
people and families should be feasible. Public administration and 
public services are often badly run: this is not just a question of 
using resources more efficiently, but also, for example, identify-
ing reforms in education that will improve outcomes and result 
in qualifications that promote employability. At the same time, 
active industrial policies are needed, with cities in the driving seat, 
to promote innovation and entrepreneurship, while facilitating 
the growth of employment-generating SMEs. How can the most 
depressed regions in the EU be given a viable economic future, 
by putting in place a modern industrial policy that supports invest-
ment in innovation, infrastructure and human capital? The aim 
would be to promote the growth of new industries that provide the 
next generation of employment opportunity. What does this mean 
for state aid rules within the single market? How can structural 
funds be used more creatively to promote growth? 
•	 As this report has shown, living standards in the EU are diverging 
sharply: what more should be done to ensure minimum standards 
such as a European-wide income guarantee through a common 
minimum wage and minimum family income across the EU? 
If richer member states want to stem the flow of unskilled migra-
tion from poorer EU member states, then would it not be in their 
interests to meet part of the costs of such a policy? 
•	 Young people in Europe have so far borne the brunt of the cri-
sis, suffering the sharpest fall in living standards and facing the 
greatest prospect of unemployment since the crisis: the EU has 
legislate for a European employment guarantee, but what more 
should be done to advance the interests of Europe’s youngest 
citizens? How can the north assist the south to better train its 
young people and close the deficit in intermediate skills? Can 
young people who have migrated to the north to acquire skills be 
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offered support to return to their member states and set up new 
small businesses? 
•	 Migration has created renewed social tensions particularly in 
western Europe: how can the rights of migrant labour be protected 
while at the same time enforcing social standards that safeguard 
indigenous workers from exploitation? What is needed to prevent 
a race to the bottom in the EU?
•	 How can the EU act to prevent tax evasion and aggressive tax 
avoidance particularly within the financial services sector which 
serves to weaken the tax base of member states in ways that inhibit 
public investment and effective government intervention?
•	 The EU needs to make more effective use of existing instruments 
in order to promote socially inclusive policies: how can the EU 
budget be reformed so as to promote social investment in an era of 
budgetary constraint? Is there a window of opportunity to revisit 
the current common agricultural policy arrangements? 
The risk is that the emerging divide within Europe will become a 
time bomb that threatens the stability of the EU’s political cohesion. 
It could provoke electorates to support policies that, at best, threaten 
the EU while, at worst, risk reviving the continent’s very worst 
memories of political extremism and intolerance. The challenge for 
policymakers is to defuse this ticking time bomb with policies that 
promote EU-wide improvements in growth, incomes, jobs and lower 
inequality.
NOTES
1. Mason, P. ‘If Europe is to Overcome Islamist Terror, It Needs 
to Fight for the Values It Holds Dear’, The Guardian, 11 January 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/11/europe- 
survive-islamist-terror-learn-to-fight-for-values-holds-dear.
2. Alonso, S. ‘A Perfect Storm: Europe’s Growing North-South Divide’, 




3. Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2014), Revolt on the Right: Explaining 
Support for the Radical Right in Britain, London: Routledge.
4. Monti, M. ‘Europe’s North and South Must Reform Together’, 
Financial Times, 19 December 2013.
5. Taylor 2015.
69
SECTION 2. ECONOMIES AND LABOUR MARKETS
2.1: Actual and Predicted GDP
Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the economic activ-
ity, defined as the value of all goods and services produced less the 
value of any goods or services used in their creation. The calcula-
tion of the annual growth rate of GDP volume is intended to allow 
comparisons of the dynamics of economic development both over 
time and between economies of different sizes. For measuring the 
growth rate of GDP in terms of volumes, the GDP at current prices 
are valued in the prices of the previous year and the thus computed 
volume changes are imposed on the level of a reference year; this is 
called a chain-linked series. Accordingly, price movements will not 
inflate the growth rate.
2.2–2.4: GDP per Person
Expressing GDP in PPS (purchasing power standards) eliminates 
differences in price levels between countries, and calculations on a 
per head basis allows for the comparison of economies significantly 





Median equivalised disposable income is the median incomes of 
households, after tax and other deductions, that is available for 
spending or saving, divided by the number of household members 
converted into equalised adults; household members are equalised or 
made equivalent by weighting each according to their age, using the 
so-called modified OECD equivalence scale.
The equivalised disposable income is calculated in three steps:
•	 all monetary incomes received from any source by each member 
of a household are added up; these include income from work, 
investment and social benefits, plus any other household income; 
taxes and social contributions that have been paid, are deducted 
from this sum;
•	 in order to reflect differences in a household’s size and composi-
tion, the total (net) household income is divided by the number 
of ‘equivalent adults’, using a standard (equivalence) scale: the 
modified OECD scale; this scale gives a weight to all members of 
the household (and then adds these up to arrive at the equivalised 
household size):
 { 1.0 to the first adult;
 { 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and over;
 { 0.3 to each child aged under 14.
•	 finally, the resulting figure is called the equivalised disposable 
income and is attributed equally to each member of the household.
The purchasing power standard, abbreviated as PPS, is an artifi-
cial currency unit. Theoretically, one PPS can buy the same amount 
of goods and services in each country. However, price differences 
across borders mean that different amounts of national currency 
units are needed for the same goods and services depending on the 
country. PPS are derived by dividing any economic aggregate of 
a country in national currency by its respective purchasing power 
parities.
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PPS is the technical term used by Eurostat for the common cur-
rency in which national accounts aggregates are expressed when 
adjusted for price level differences using PPPs. Thus, PPPs can be 
interpreted as the exchange rate of the PPS against the euro.
2.7: Employment
The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of 
persons aged 20–64 in employment by the total population of the 
same age group. The indicator is based on the EU Labour Force 
Survey. The survey covers the entire population living in private 
households and excludes those in collective households such as 
boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. Employed popula-
tion consists of those persons who during the reference week did any 
work for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but 
had jobs from which they were temporarily absent. 
2.9: Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage 
of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people 
employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons 
aged 15–74 who were: (a) without work during the reference week, 
(b) currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employ-
ment or self-employment before the end of the two weeks following 
the reference week, (c) actively seeking work, i.e. had taken specific 
steps in the four weeks period ending with the reference week to 
seek paid employment or self-employment or who found a job to 
start later, i.e. within a period of, at most, three months.
2.10: Employment of Older Workers
The employment rate of older workers is calculated by dividing 
the number of persons in employment and aged 55–64 by the total 
population of the same age group. The indicator is based on the EU 
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Labour Force Survey. The survey covers the entire population living 
in private households and excludes those in collective households 
such as boarding houses, halls of residence and hospitals. Employed 
population consists of those persons who during the reference week 
did any work for pay or profit for at least one hour, or were not work-
ing but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent.
2.11: Median Incomes of Older People/Pensions 
Expenditure
The indicator is defined as the ratio between the median equivalised 
disposable income of persons aged 65 or over and the median equiv-
alised disposable income of persons aged between 0 and 64.
The ‘Pensions’ aggregate comprises part of periodic cash benefits 
under the disability, old-age, survivors and unemployment func-
tions. It is defined as the sum of the following social benefits: dis-
ability pension, early-retirement due to reduced capacity to work, 
old-age pension, anticipated old-age pension, partial pension, sur-
vivors’ pension, early-retirement benefit for labour market reasons.
2.12: Youth Unemployment/NEET Rates
For youth unemployment, see 2.9 definition.
The indicator young people neither in employment nor in educa-
tion and training (NEET) provides information on young people 
aged 15–24 who meet the following two conditions: (a) they are not 
employed (i.e. unemployed or inactive according to the International 
Labour Organisation definition) and (b) they have not received any 
education or training in the four weeks preceding the survey. Data 
are expressed as a percentage of the total population in the same age 
group and sex, excluding the respondents who have not answered 
the question ‘participation to education and training’ and in change 
over three years (in percentage points). Data comes from the Euro-
pean Union Labour Force Survey.
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2.13: National Insurance Registrations (UK)
The DWP National Insurance data covers people allocated a 
National Insurance Number (NINo) for all types of work – including 
the self-employed and students working part-time – and whatever 
the length of stay in the UK. It also covers adult overseas nationals 
allocated a NINo to claim benefits or tax credits. In addition, the data 
is a 100 per cent sample held at case-level data sources.

